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What's A Mallet For: A 
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Abstract: At the woodworker’s bench, a wooden mallet is used primarily 
for striking chisels. This is a straightforward answer to the question, 
‘What's a mallet for?’.  It is an account that focuses upon tool use as an 
activity that does something to the world – a mallet drives a chisel in 
order to remove waste wood.  In this paper however, I aim to reconsider 
mallets, and tools more generally, not just as artefacts that enable 
us to do things to the world, but also as instruments for finding out 
how those things are going. The paper is based around a critique of 
David Pye’s concept of the workmanship of risk.  My argument states 
that understandings of production such as Pye’s rely on an entirely 
pragmatic account of tool use, and action more generally, as a means 
of realising preconceived ideas in the material world.  I draw on the 
concept of epistemic actions, which are actions intended to improve 
our understanding of a situation and aid decision making, in order to 
counter this tendency.  This discussion is presented alongside a portable 
workbench and work-in-progress mallet I am making.  By demonstrating 
the production and use of a mallet at the workbench during RTD 2017, 
I aim to illustrate my argument and describe its significance for how we 
talk about, and practice, designing and making.
Philip Luscombe
Northumbria University, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK
philip.luscombe@northumbria.ac.uk
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Luscombe | A portable workbench, spokeshave, coping saw and mallet-in-progress
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The ideas within this paper are a result of reflecting on my own practice 
as a woodworker and learning from the writing of others.  The discussion 
is presented alongside a portable workbench, upon which I will exhibit 
a mallet head I have made, some unfinished mallet handles and a small 
collection tools with which the handles may be completed (see the 
feature image on the previous page). The exhibition of the workbench, 
tools and mallet parts will be used to demonstrate some of the concepts 
introduced in the in the paper, engaging conference attendees with 
these ideas in a practical way. In the final part of this paper, for example, 
I contrast the character of two tools - a spokeshave and coping saw 
- in order to describe their influence upon the process of designing 
and making a mallet handle. Using the spokeshave or coping saw at 
the workbench will give delegates the opportunity to reflect on the 
significance of these differences in practice.
Whilst grounded in the context of woodworking, the discussion of tools 
as simultaneously for doing things and also finding out how those things 
are going is intended to be of broader interest to the research through 
design community. I hope that others may find parallels with their own 
practice, and be prompted to consider the epistemic character of the 
designing and making tools that they use.
Introduction
At the woodworker’s bench, a wooden mallet is used primarily for 
striking chisels.  It is especially suited to this task in two ways.  Firstly, 
owing to the large area of its face, a mallet does not require a high 
degree of striking precision.  Rather than concentrating on trying to hit 
the handle of a chisel, this enables a woodworker to instead focus their 
attention on the chisel’s cutting edge.  Second, because it has a wooden 
head, the mallet does not tend to damage chisel handles, or recoil from 
them.  Wooden mallets deliver a firm, easily controllable blow.
This is a straightforward answer to the question, ‘What is a mallet 
for?’.  It is an account that focuses upon tool use as an activity that does 
something to the world – a mallet drives a chisel in order to remove 
waste wood.  In this paper however, I aim to reconsider mallets, and tools 
more generally, not just as artefacts that enable us to do things to the 
world, but also as instruments for finding out how those things are going.
The paper is based around a critique of David Pye’s concept of 
the workmanship of risk.  My argument states that commonplace 
understandings of production, such as Pye’s, rely on an entirely pragmatic 
account of tool use, and action more generally, as a means of realising 
preconceived ideas in the material world.  I draw on the concept of 
epistemic actions, which are intended to improve our understanding of a 
situation and aid decision making, in order to counter this tendency.
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How To Chop a Mortise & The Problem 
with Pye
Chopping a Mortise using the Workmanship of Risk 
The traditional ‘carpenter’s mallet’ has a rectangular head and tapered 
handle (Watson [1982] 2002, pp.184-5) (Fig. 1).  As with all other 
traditional mallet forms, the carpenter’s pattern has developed to make 
use of the materials and manufacturing techniques readily available 
to the woodworker.  Until the advent of industrialised production, 
most woodworking tools would be made in this way, by a woodworker 
themselves utilising well-suited offcuts.  The carpenter’s mallet may 
therefore be produced using a small collection of hand tools (Fig. 2) and 
two pieces of otherwise waste wood. 
Perhaps the most difficult process in the manufacture of the mallet is 
chopping the mortise (Fig. 3).  This is a rectangular hole cut through 
the mallet head, with sides tapered to match the taper of the handle.  
The fit of the mortise must be close, so as to provide an effective joint 
that does not work loose.  To chop a mortise with a chisel successfully 
requires practice.  The procedure is an instance of what design and craft 
theorist David Pye calls the workmanship of risk.  This phrase describes 
techniques wherein the quality of the result is continually at risk and 
relies upon the ‘judgement, dexterity and care’ ([1968] 1995, p.20) of a 
Figure 2. The tools required for mallet making (left to right: Panel saw, Chisel, No.4 Plane, 
Spokeshave, Marking Guage, Mallet).
Figure 1. A traditional carpenter's mallet pattern
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practitioner throughout the process.  The risk is that the result could, at 
any moment, deviate from the design intention.  Our mortise could be 
cut at the wrong angle, made too big, or taper incorrectly. 
Many aspects of mortise chopping can be considered strategies for 
mitigating this risk.  One example involves making the width of the 
mortise the same width as a chisel.  Provided the chisel does not twist in 
the cut, we can then be assured that the mortise width will be cut exactly 
to size.  Such strategies for improving precision are common throughout 
woodworking.  And they are consistent with Pye’s more general account 
of workmanship – ‘[a]ll workmen using the workmanship of risk’, he 
writes, ‘are constantly devising ways to limit the risk by using things such 
as jigs and templates.  If you want to draw a straight line with your pen, 
you do not go at it freehand, but use a ruler, that is to say, a jig.  There is 
still a risk of blots and kinks, but less risk’ (Ibid., p.21).
In The Nature and Art of Workmanship (Ibid.), David Pye presents the 
workmanship of risk in contrast to the workmanship of certainty.  Where 
the workmanship of risk describes processes that rely on continual 
adjustment, care and dexterity throughout, the workmanship of 
certainty relates to techniques wherein the results of production are 
‘predetermined and unalterable once production begins’ (Ibid., p.22).  
Our efforts to improve precision when making mallets or drawing lines 
with a ruler can, therefore, be understood as attempts to make the 
outcomes more certain.
Figure 3. The process of marking out and chopping a mortise, and planing the handle to 
fit. Notice the mortise guage being set to the width of the chisel in the first image. 6
value, David Pye’s ideas remain key reference points (see, for example, 
McCullough 1998, pp.202-3).  Contemporary woodworkers such as Peter 
Galbert still find a valuable link between Pye’s writing and their work 
(2015, p. xiii).  And in broader anthropological enquiry, Pye’s analyses of 
human production are readily repurposed in studies of craft practice (see, 
for example, Keller and Keller 1996, p.56; Bunn 2011, p.24; Ingold 2001, 
p.21). 
The Problem with Pye
In what follows, I aim to demonstrate that, despite being widespread 
and having a common sense appeal, David Pye’s theory of production 
is a limited one.  In short, I argue that Pye’s account of making, as 
the realisation of a pre-existing design intent precludes a richer 
understanding of the influence of tools, techniques and materials upon 
creative practice (this is an argument already rehearsed across disciplines 
interested in human production. See, for example, Ingold, T. (2010), 
Knappett, C. (2005) & Malafouris, L. (2013)).  The focus of my criticism 
lies in what I consider to be Pye’s entirely pragmatic understanding of 
productive techniques.  Under Pye’s analyses, tools are always employed 
in the pursuit of pre-formed objectives, with all action assumed to be an 
effort to move towards those objectives.  Later in this paper, I introduce 
the notion of epistemic action in order to demonstrate the flaws in this 
one-directional account of action.  Epistemic actions are those performed 
in order to help work things out, to uncover new information and help 
The Enduring Relevance of Pye’s Analyses
Pye’s workmanship of risk and certainty introduced, as craft theorist 
Glenn Adamson observes, a ‘purposeful reframing of [the] dichotomy 
between craft and industry, or hand and machine’ (2007, p.73).  By 
defining production in terms of risk and certainty, Pye’s analyses can be 
applied universally across different processes, scales, types of production 
and work environments.  The Nature and Art of Workmanship considers 
all kinds of making, from the free workmanship of Pye’s own wood 
carving practice, to the highly regulated manufacture of industrially-
produced artefacts.  In fact, much of Pye’s writing can be understood 
as an attempt to discredit any valorisation of handwork over machine 
work.  Pye was determined that the techniques of production – be they 
the swing of a mallet, or the pass of a machine tool – should be the 
subject of rational analysis, rather than indicators of a greater or lesser 
degree of moral virtue.  Pye is quick to insist that even the largest volume 
manufacturing processes can rely on the workmanship of risk at some 
point ([1968] 1995, p.21).  And he uses his own woodworking experience 
to describe how even the seemingly unguided chisel is inclined to travel 
in a certain direction, with the shape of its bevel and the grain of the 
timber forming a semi-determining system (Ibid., p.28). 
For Adamson, Pye’s legacy is clear – his writing on workmanship 
constitutes ‘the most compelling technical discussion of skilled work 
ever written’ (Adamson 2007, p.72).  In other reappraisals of craft’s 
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people make decisions (Kirsh & Maglio 1994).  For now, however, I aim 
to further interrogate the foundation of Pye’s pragmatic approach and 
describe its limitations. 
Pye’s Separation of Workmanship from Design
The technical clarity to which David Pye aspires is, as design and craft 
theorists Christopher Frayling and Helen Snowdon observe, only 
made possible by a separation of the processes of design from those 
of workmanship (1982, p.19).  In order to describe the techniques of 
making according to the risk or certainty with which they may achieve 
a predetermined objective, it is necessary for Pye to divorce them from 
any role in processes of design.  The workmanship of risk involves a risk 
that results will deviate from intentions.  Whether a design is specified on 
paper, or in the mind of a practitioner, Pye always assumes that it exists in 
advance of its material realisation. 
It is a consequence of this assumption that the imprecision of the word 
‘skill’ was so troubling for Pye ([1968] 1995, p.52) – the way in which skill 
can be applied to describe both physical operations or to decision making 
blurs the distinction upon which Pye’s account of workmanship relies.  
Pye therefore claimed that it is ‘necessary to differentiate between skill 
as the exercising of constraint on movement and “skill” as know-how, 
for know-how, in making, is design.  Thus according to the terms of this 
book one should say that anybody has skill enough to build a good dry-
stone wall but that few know how to design one, for the placing of the 
stones is a matter of knowledge and judgement, not of dexterity’ (Pye 
[1978] 1999, p.52).  Pye would rather not discuss dry-stone walling as 
a skilled activity, because it does not demand a high degree of physical 
dexterity.  If someone can lift and place a stone, then, with instruction, 
they should be able to make a good wall.  Dry-stone walling demands a 
kind of knowledge that can be described in words, and, for Pye, this kind 
of knowledge is a matter of design.
Pye’s account of production divides designing and making along the 
same lines as many other thinkers (for a discussion, see Ingold 2010, 
pp.91-3).  But I now aim to demonstrate that this account of production 
is not as comprehensive as it might seem.  My argument rests on 
Pye’s failure to see the potential for making practice, and action more 
generally, to operate in anything other than a pragmatic way.  That is to 
say that Pye assumes all action to be intended to move a practitioner 
directly towards a goal.
In Pye’s account of dry-stone walling, for example, the critical type 
of knowledge is mental know-how, as divorced from the relatively 
straightforward action of picking up and placing stones.  It is assumed 
that these actions are employed to enact instructions sent out from an 
internal world of thought.  In practice, however, action is not only used 
in this way.  It is not only part of a one-directional path from an internal 
idea towards a predetermined external result.  In an example that is 
8
more domestic, but analogous with the work of a dry-stone wall building, 
philosopher of mind Andy Clark has observed that, to complete a jigsaw, 
one does not sit staring at puzzle pieces in an effort to develop a plan 
of action (1997, p.36).  No one imagines that it is possible to consider 
all the required moves and piece rotations in your head and then enact 
them with successful results.  What the successful jigsaw player must 
do is pick pieces up, spin them around, and try things out for fit.  The 
completion of a jigsaw in the real world proceeds by way of step-by-step 
transformations, which give both pragmatic results (the correct fitting of 
a piece) and an improved understanding of the task (as in the grouping 
of similarly coloured pieces).  Even if we assume that the dry-stone wall 
builder has a clear vision of the ultimate outcome (just as there is only 
one correct solution to a jigsaw puzzle), they must still use action to both 
build the wall and improve their understanding of the task.  Actions like 
sensing the weight of a stone, rotating it to assess its suitability, physically 
sorting stones into types, or checking their balance as they are placed can 
all be considered epistemic, rather than pragmatic actions.  It is under 
this kind of interrogation that the sharply demarcated boundary between 
design and workmanship, thinking and doing, or know-how and skill, 
begins to falter.  It leaves no space for epistemic action. 
Epistemic Action
Epistemic action is a term developed by David Kirsh and Paul Maglio, in 
order to distinguish between two types of actions – those that aim to 
change the state of the world to accomplish a goal (pragmatic actions), 
and those that are taken ‘to change the world in order to simplify the 
problem-solving task’ (epistemic actions) (1994, p.513).  In an influential 
paper studying how expert Tetris players rotated puzzle pieces on a 
video game screen in order to aid decision making, Kirsh and Maglio 
introduced the concept of epistemic action to redress what they saw 
as a failure in their field of cognitive science.  Kirsh and Maglio aimed 
to challenge planning-based approaches to cognition, which see action 
as fundamentally pragmatic, and where the ‘only reason to act was for 
advancement in the physical world’ (Ibid., p.526).  In this view, thinking 
always proceeds action and action can, at best, lead someone to re-
evaluate their conclusions.  Crucially, and herein lies Kirsh and Maglio’s 
main criticism, in solely pragmatic accounts of human behaviour, action 
is never undertaken ‘in order to alter the way cognition proceeds […,] 
cognition is logically prior: cognition is necessary for intelligent action, 
but action is never necessary for intelligent cognition.’ (Ibid., p.526)  The 
tendency to prioritise cognition over action, therefore assuming every 
action to be pragmatic is the same tendency we find in David Pye’s 
writing above.
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In expert Tetris play, Kirsh and Maglio observe how rotating and 
moving a piece on screen is not always done to advance towards the 
goals of the game, but can be used to test potential means of action, 
speed up decision making and reduce errors.  ‘The point of [epistemic] 
actions’, conclude Kirsh and Maglio, ‘is not for the effect they have on 
the environment as much as for the effect they have on the agent.’ 
(Ibid., p.546)
Epistemic Action and The Extended Mind
The concept of epistemic action has been taken up across disciplines 
interested in the relationship between thought, action and the 
material world (see, for example, Knappett 2005, p.42; Malafouris 
2013, p.194).  One of the best known and most influential applications 
of Kirsh and Maglio’s work is found in a paper by philosophers of 
mind Andy Clark (of the above jigsaw example) and David Chalmers, 
entitled The Extended Mind (1998).  Clark and Chalmers begin by 
asking ‘Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?’ 
(Ibid., p.7).  As suggested by the paper’s title, Clark and Chalmers’ 
answer is to understand the mind not as limited by the bounds of the 
skull, skin or body, but as a coupling of humans and their environment.  
Thinking thus takes place not only within the confines of human brains 
and bodies, but within a cognitive system that relies on two-way 
interactions between people and things.
For Clark and Chalmers, examples of such cognitive systems can be found 
everywhere – in the rearrangement of Scrabble tiles, the use of pen and 
paper to solve maths problems, interactions with navigation instruments 
and an Alzheimer’s patient’s notebook.  Indeed, they regard the ‘general 
paraphernalia of language, books, diagrams, and culture’ (Ibid., p.8) to all 
operate as parts of extended minds.  Under Clark and Chalmers’ analysis 
of cognition, any aspect of a human’s environment has the potential to 
become part of a human mind.  Minds are everywhere, forever being 
reconfigured as people pursue new goals and rely on different parts of the 
world to aid cognition. 
Kirsh and Maglio’s description of epistemic action is an important 
influence upon Clark and Chalmers.  The theory of extended mind 
builds upon the idea that actions are performed not just to advance 
towards a goal, but also to work things out.  If parts of the world are 
used during a process that ‘were it done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process’ (Ibid.), then 
Clark and Chalmers believe the things used during that process should be 
recognized as the components of minds.  ‘In a very real sense’, they write, 
‘the re-arrangement of [Scrabble] tiles on the tray is not part of action; it 
is part of thought’ (Ibid., p.10).  Importantly for the present study, Clark 
and Chalmers propose that this epistemic action ‘demands spread of 
epistemic credit’ (Ibid., p.8). 
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What is a Mallet For?
In an effort to demonstrate how my criticism of Pye and the above 
discussion of epistemic actions might benefit designing and making 
practice, I conclude this paper by returning to the subject of mallet use.  
The aim is to complement Pye’s useful, but wholly pragmatic, account 
of human production with an examination of the epistemic nature of 
tool use.  Ultimately, I suggest that the tools and techniques of designing 
and making may be understood not only by the degree of certainty with 
which they may achieve pre-conceived ends, but by the ways in which 
they support epistemic action.  Before discussing the significance of this 
understanding for practice, I first revisit a subject that Pye preferred to 
avoid - the nature of skill.  Through studying skill in more detail, I aim to 
develop a description of tool use that, inspired by the theory of extended 
mind, is simultaneously epistemic and pragmatic.
Nikolai Bernstein on Dexterity
As observed by Glenn Adamson, if there is any place in David Pye’s 
theories for the concept of skill, it is only as an equivalent to the 
determining jigs of machines (2007, p.73).  Just as jigs allow an action to 
proceed in a predetermined way, The Nature and Art of Workmanship 
considers human dexterity to be the ability to control movement 
according to a specific intent.  The skill employed by a woodworker 
when chopping a mortise is the ability to control a chisel’s path.  It is 
uncontroversial to say that all skilled work like this, or all workmanship 
of the risky kind, requires practice and repetition.  The mallet and chisel 
may be wielded with precision only once a woodworker has developed 
the requisite dexterity.  How exactly this dexterity operates, or how the 
process of becoming dexterous occurs, however, were not questions 
which David Pye tackled directly.  For a more detailed analysis of the 
nature of dexterity, I turn to neurophysiologist Nikolai Bernstein’s 
pioneering and posthumously published book, On Dexterity and Its 
Development (Bernstein 1996).
Bernstein shared Pye’s physical interpretation of skill and chose to 
study the technique of expert blacksmiths in order to gain insight into 
how this skill is developed (Gurfinkel and Cordo 1998, p.3).  Bernstein 
criticised the idea that skilled action was the result of learned sequences 
of movements, somehow stored in the central nervous system and 
sent out to the muscles in a one-way process.  Using the then novel 
technique of high speed photography (much of Bernstein’s work was 
carried out in the 1920s), Bernstein tracked the movement of experienced 
blacksmiths’ arms and their hammers whilst they repeatedly hit the 
same point on an anvil.  Plotting the trajectories of the arm joints 
and the face of the hammer, Bernstein identified that, although the 
movement of the hammerhead was highly consistent across multiple 
strikes, the arrangement of the arm joints varied each time.  The outcome 
of the blacksmith’s action was repeatable, even though the means by 
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which this solution was arrived at changed with every strike.  This 
was evidence to Bernstein that the smith had not become skilled by 
internalising a repeatable programme for their hammer swing.  The 
years spent developing precise hammering skill were not, it appeared, 
used to develop a specific pattern of muscle and joint movement.  
The blacksmiths of Bernstein’s experiment were instead experts at 
solving the problem of delivering the hammer face to exactly the 
same point, despite the variable elasticity of their muscles and the 
unpredictable recoil of the tool (Latash 1996, pp.286-7).  At first, this 
seems a strange paradox – how can it be the motion of the hammer 
that is reproducible, rather than the motion of the blacksmith’s arm 
itself (Ingold 2001, p.21; Latash 1996, p.286)?  But if, as Bernstein 
describes, the essence of dexterity lies in a sensitivity to ever changing, 
emergent and unpredictable internal and external states, the repetition 
without repetition witnessed in the study of blacksmiths is a necessary 
condition of skilled activity.  The consequence of this repeated solving 
is an enhanced sensitivity to the progress of a task and, therefore, an 
improved ability to apply force with precision.
Tool use is both epistemic and pragmatic
I hope now to make clear the parallels between Bernstein’s discussion of 
skilled activity and Kirsh and Maglio’s description of epistemic action.  In 
both, we find criticisms of one-way interpretations of action.  Bernstein 
refutes the idea that skilled hammer movements are the result of fixed, 
repeatable patterns sent outwards from the nervous system to the 
muscles.  And Kirsh and Maglio demonstrate that expert Tetris players 
do not work out solutions in their head and then input those solutions 
into the game.  In both Bernstein’s study of hammering and Kirsh and 
Maglio’s analysis of Tetris then, responding to sensory feedback is key 
to the tasks’ success.  Throughout a game of Tetris, players use action 
not just to complete the game’s objectives, but also to help work out 
the best moves.  The rotation and lateral movement of zoids is used 
both to generate sensory feedback (to help cognition) and to achieve 
success in the game.  Similarly, throughout the process of hammering, 
with every swing and strike, a practitioner must be continually alert 
and perceptive to feedback.  The strike of the hammer, in addition to 
achieving a pragmatic result in the world, provides sensorial feedback.  
As they are shaping metal, knocking in nails, or driving chisels, 
hammers and mallets also report on the progress of these tasks.  In 
both Tetris gameplay and skilled tool use, we find what Tim Ingold calls 
a ‘coupling of perception and action’ (2011, p.58).  It is this coupling 
that erodes any boundary between thought and action, or, as theorists 
of the extended mind would claim, between mind and world.  
This description of tool use as simultaneously pragmatic and epistemic 
allows us to develop a richer account of what tools are for. I wish to 
argue that a mallet, just as it might usually be considered for achieving 
pragmatic results (wasting wood with a chisel etc.), is also for reporting 
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on the progress of the task.  And tools and techniques more generally 
may be discussed in terms of their potential for working things out 
through epistemic action, in addition to their pragmatic effectiveness.
Bernstein’s observations on dexterity are fundamental to this description 
of tool use.  If we are to ignore Bernstein’s contribution and assume 
mallet use to involve the enacting of a pre-programmed, learned 
sequence of movement, then the effectiveness of a mallet would depend 
little upon the quality of feedback it provides throughout the process.  
The best mallet might simply be the one that gets the job done as quickly 
as possible.  But if we acknowledge the requirement of a mallet user 
to be continually aware of, and respondent to, the sensory feedback of 
their tool, then the quality of that feedback is critical to success.  This 
point is perhaps obvious to experienced users of tools, where the feeling 
of working a material can be tangibly deadened by, for example, even a 
subtly dulled cutting edge (Watson [1982] 2002, p.353).  But this more 
comprehensive description of a tool use is not accounted for in one-way, 
pragmatic acounts of action such as David Pye's.
The Epistemic Character of Tools and Techniques
I conclude this paper by suggesting that the synergy of epistemic and 
pragmatic action witnessed at the level of each mallet strike may also 
be applied to the processes of designing and making more generally.  
And, just as we may describe the risk or certainty with which tools and 
techniques achieve pre-specified aims (their pragmatic effectiveness), 
I suggest we should also consider their epistemic character.  This has 
practical implications during designing and making practice.  If some tools 
and techniques have a character that supports epistemic action, then 
they may be selected over others not just on the grounds of how well 
they achieve a result, but also for the aid to decision making that they 
offer along the way.  One such selection can be demonstrated using the 
workbench, tools and unfinished mallet handles presented at RTD 2017.
The Spokeshave and The Coping Saw
When making a mallet, one of the latter stages in the process involves 
shaping the handle, so that it is more comfortable in the hand.  Using 
a spokeshave, the shaping can proceed by small steps, in increments 
determined by the maximum thickness of shaving the tool can take (Fig. 
4).  The nature of spokeshave use thus sees a woodworker presented with 
the emergent form after each pass with the tool.  We may then pause 
to check the result and make adjustments if required, until the handle 
becomes pleasing to hold.  
An alternative to the spokeshave method would be to saw the handle to 
shape and then smooth the rough sawn edge with a scraper.  If it is to 
be sawn by hand, a coping saw would typically be used for this kind of 
shaping work (Fig. 5).  Although it is not necessary to do so, a pencil line 
is usually marked as a guide for the saw cut.  Using the coping saw, all the 
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waste is removed simultaneously, at the moment the cut is complete.  
In contrast to the step-by-step, incremental process associated with the 
spokeshave, the sawing technique therefore offers little opportunity 
for sensing the quality of an emergent result throughout.  Whether 
we mark the pencil line or not, use of the coping saw requires that 
the completed shape of the handle be anticipated in advance of cut's 
completion.  Where the nature of the spokeshave allows us to discover 
the best shape as we go, the coping saw offers no opportunity to test 
the resultant shape along the way.  Whilst both techniques may be used 
to arrive at the same outcome then, the epistemic character of the 
alternative approaches varies.
In this small example, I hope to have introduced the significance 
of a discussion of the epistemic character of tools and techniques.  
Complementing David Pye's analyses of risk and certainty in production 
with a consideration of techniques' epistemic character would, I suggest, 
provide designers, makers and those employing designing and making in 
research with a valuable insight into their practice.
Figure 4. Using a spokeshave Figure 5. Using a coping saw
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